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CIRCUMVENTING DA UBERT IN THE GENE POOL
Erica Beecher-Monas*
I. INTRODUCTION
Genetic testimony is appearing in a variety of civil and criminal trials. This
testimony is being introduced by plaintiffs and defendants in civil cases, and by
prosecutors and defendants in criminal cases. The level of judicial scrutiny to which
such expert testimony is subjected varies widely according to context, even among
Daubert jurisdictions. At one extreme, civil judges confronting expert genetic testimony
by and large put the testifying experts through their Daubert paces in explaining the
scientific basis for their testimony, whether for plaintiffs or defendants. At the other
extreme, judges confronting defense evidence of biological links to violence in criminal
cases rarely exclude it on the basis of a Daubert analysis. Rather, they refuse to order
genetic testing in the first place, thus precluding the development of evidence, or they
exclude it on policy grounds (the statutory exclusion of substance abuse testimony to
negate intent or in mitigation in most states is an example), or characterize it as a
redundant family of behavioral testimony, unhelpful, or confusing to the jury.
Despite the claims of numerous scholars that behavioral genetics is the future of
criminal justice,' the courts remain skeptical about this link. This may be due in part to
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School.
1. See e.g. Lori B. Andrews, Predicting and Punishing Antisocial Acts: How the Criminal Justice System
Might Use Behavioral Genetics, in Behavioral Genetics: The Clash of Culture and Biology 116, 1354-35
(Ronald A. Carson & Mark A. Rothstein eds., Johns Hopkins U. Press 1999) (suggesting that, in the future, the
state might "take into consideration not just genes for criminal behavior, but genes thought to be associated
with precursors to criminal behavior"); Lindsay A. Elkins, Student Author, Five Foot Two with Eyes of Blue:
Physical Profiling and the Prospect of a Genetics-Based Criminal Justice System, 17 Notre Dame J.L., Ethics
& Pub. Policy 269, 271 (2003) (arguing that "DNA analysis could serve as an antidote to racial profiling" and
exploring the "broader implications of using genetic research"); BettyAnn H. Kevles & Daniel J. Kevles,
Scapegoat Biology: As Violence Continues to Ravage Our Society, Researchers are Raising Hopes that Science
Alone Can Save Us from Our Worst Natures-Again, Discover 58, 60 (Oct. 1, 1997) (noting that crime joins
"many aspects of human life for which it is claimed that biology is destiny"); Nicole H. Rafter, Seeing and
Believing: Images of Heredity in Biological Theories of Crime, 67 Brook. L. Rev. 71, 96 (2001) (forecasting
that "pop criminologists may soon come up with recommendations for genetic engineering"); Nikolas Rose,
The Biology of Culpability: Pathological Identity and Crime Control in a Biological Culture, 4 Theoretical
Criminology 5, 6-7 (2000); Jasmine A. Tehrani & Samoff A. Mednick, Genetic Factors and Criminal
Behavior, 64 Fed. Probation 24, 26 (2000) (concluding that "crime prevention efforts may be most effective
when all risks, social and genetic, are evaluated"); David Wasserman, Is There Value in Identifying Individual
Genetic Predispositions to Violence? 32 J.L., Med. & Ethics 24, 24 (2004) (forecasting the expanded use of
behavioral genetics in crime control); Rhonda J. Yen, Tourette's Syndrome: A Case Example for Mandatory
Genetic Regulation of Behavioral Disorders, 27 L. & Psychol. Rev. 29, 29 (asserting that "the vision of
Gattaca [a 1997 movie depicting a society driven by genetic engineering] is closer than many of us realize");
Kathy Hudson & Aaron M. Bailey, Keynote Address, The Human Genome Project, DNA Science and the Law:
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the long shadow cast by the eugenics movement and eugenicists' racial biases, which has
made the topic of behavioral genetics a difficult subject to discuss. Differences in gene
expression to environmental challenges, on the other hand, do not carry this negative
baggage. 2  As a result, toxic tort plaintiffs increasingly attempt to overcome the
difficulties of proving exposure levels, general causation, and heightened susceptibility
through genetic testimony. 3 Defendants also seek to use genetic information to show
alternative causes for plaintiffs' injuries.4
What is remarkable about these cases is the difference in care with which the
judges examine the scientific validity of the proffered expert testimony. For example, in
Hall v. State,5 a capital murder case, the court admitted (without any analysis) defense
testimony that the defendant had characteristics typical of XYY and other genetic
disorders, as well as fetal alcohol syndrome.6 Not that it did the defendant much good,
since the defendant was convicted of capital murder, and even after the U.S. Supreme
Court vacated in light of Atkins v. Virginia7 and remanded for a mental retardation
determination, 8 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed defendant's death
sentence. 9 Rather than analyze the basis for the expert testimony, or hold an evidentiary
hearing on the matter, the Court of Criminal Appeals merely noted that the experts had
disagreed on retardation (although they agreed on defendant's XYY condition), and the
defendant's school records failed to note that he was retarded, so the Court of Criminal
Appeals held that the evidence supported the conclusion that the defendant was not
mentally retarded, and thus eligible to be executed.10 No analysis was made at any point
in the judicial process of the expert testimony regarding the link between XYY and
mental retardation.
Perhaps this absence of analysis is due to judicial incredulity as to a link between
biology and behavior. Certainly it is true that many links initially "discovered" between
violent behavior and genes have been subsequently discredited. The XYY defense is a
good example of this phenomenon. Studies in British prisons had observed a higher rate
The American Legal System's Response to Breakthroughs in Genetic Science (Washington, D.C., Oct. 19,
2001), in 51 Am. L. Rev. 431, 443 (2002) (forecasting changes when behavioral genetics enters into the
criminal justice system in terms of defenses and predisposition to commit crime).
2. To date, roughly 600 environmentally sensitive genes have been identified by the environmental
research arm of the Human Genome project. See Nati. Inst. Env. Health Sci., Environmental Genome Project,
http://www.niehs.nih.gov/research/supported/programs/egp/index.cfm (accessed Apr. 5, 2008).
3. See Gary E. Marchant, Genetic Data in Toxic Tort Litigation, 14 J.L. & Policy 7, 8 (2006) (noting that
"genetic data has the potential to transform toxic torts").
4. See e.g. Barrow v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 1998 WL 812318 at *37 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 1998) (plaintiffs'
expert biomarker testimony in silicone breast implant case was inadmissible in light of defense expert
testimony that the same biomarkers can appear in women without silicone implants).
5. 160 S.W.3d 24, 33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), cert. denied, Hall v. Tex., 545 U.S. 1141 (2005).
6. Id. at 33.
7. 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (prohibiting execution of mentally retarded defendants).
8. Hall v. Tex., 537 U.S. 802 (2002).
9. Hall, 160 S.W.3d at40.
10. Id. at39-40.
11. See e.g. Sheila Jasanoff, Just Evidence: The Limits of Science in the Legal Process, 34 J.L., Med. &
Ethics 328, 338 (2006) (observing that prior attempts to link genes and behavior have been premature and
controversial, giving as an example the Violence Initiative of the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health
Administration, which "was shot through and through with insupportable assumptions about animal as well as
human behavior").
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of XYY chromosome abnormality in convicts than was found in the general
population. 12 Initial conclusions that this was the "crime gene" were later discredited,
through studies demonstrating that XYY individuals are no more aggressive than
average.1 3 That research, however, was not the last word on XYY. More recent studies
show that men afflicted with this chromosomal abnormality tend to be less intelligent
than the norm, more impulsive and hyperactive. 
14
But links between genes and violence are not the only connections that have been
discredited on further study. Links between diseases and genes also have a history of
being "discovered" only to be subsequently discredited. 15 Yet contrast the cursory
treatment of expert XYY testimony in Hall with the extensive judicial analysis of expert
testimony regarding possible genetic influences in the claims that manganese fumes in
the welding process caused the plaintiffs' Parkinson's disease in the welding fumes
cases. 16 There, the court held extensive Daubert hearings on the evidence regarding the
interaction of environmental stimuli and genetic predisposition to the incidence of
Parkinson's disease, summarizing and analyzing the scientific basis for each expert's
testimony.
Adding further fuel to the fires of controversy is the fundamental question of what
implications follow from a genetic link to violence (or disease). The majority and
dissent in Schriro v. Landrigan,17 for example, disagreed primarily over what effect the
disputed genetic testimony would have had on the jury: The majority thought it would
not have helped the defendant (and thus counsel's failure to develop it would not be
ineffective assistance), and the dissent thought that the jury should have been able to
weigh this information in its deliberations. 18
The implications to be drawn from genetic data are equally contested in toxic tort
cases, however, so that cannot be the basis for the discrepancy in the way the criminal
courts analyze admissibility questions. For example, disputes over the significance of
biomarkers (chromosomal translocations, change in gene expression, protein
concentration or metabolites) were central in cases involving whether exposure to
benzene caused plaintiffs' acute myelogenous leukemia. 19 Similarly, in silicone breast
12. See Patricia A. Jacobs et al., Aggressive Behavior, Mental Sub-normality, and the XYY Male, 208
Nature 1351, 1351-52 (1965).
13. See David Wasserman & Robert Wachbroit, Introduction: Methods, Meanings, and Morals, in Genetics
and Criminal Behavior 1, 9 (Cambridge U. Press 2001) (discussing XYY chromosome abnormality).
Nonetheless, it may be premature to completely disregard a link between jail and genes.
14. These factors (which are genetic) may make them more likely to get caught when they do violate social
norms. See Michael J. Rutter et al., Antisocial Behavior by Young People (Cambridge U. Press 1998)
(discussing studies).
15. See e.g. Kirk E. Lohmuller et al., Meta-Analysis of Genetic Association Studies Supports a Contribution
of Common Variants to Susceptibility to Common Diseases, 33 Nature Genetics 177, 177 (2003) (finding that
when a genetic link to a complex disease is first published, the likelihood that other studies will be able to
confirm it is roughly one in three); Jack Lucenti, Gene Association Studies Typically Wrong: Reproducible
Gene-Disease Associates are Few and Far Between, 18 Scientist 20, 20 (2004).
16. In re Welding Fume Prod. Liab. Litig., 2006 WL 4507859 at **23-36 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 8, 2006)
(providing extensive analysis denying defendants' motions to exclude plaintiffs' experts, and giving a chart
summarizing the experts, thrust of each expert's testimony, and court's finding on validity).
17. 127 S. Ct. 1933 (2007).
18. Id. at 1943-55.
19. Compare Expert Testimony: Jury Returns Verdict for Oil Company after Testimony on Missing Disease
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implant cases, the implications that could be drawn from the presence of biomarkers in
plaintiffs was a matter of heated dispute.
20
Whatever the reason, civil courts scrutinize the genetic expert testimony far more
seriously than the criminal courts appear to. This Essay explores the phenomenon in
three parts. Part One discusses the sophisticated analysis engaged in by the civil courts
faced with arguments about genetic evidence. Part Two contrasts this approach with that
of the criminal courts, which tend to avoid having to analyze the scientific basis of
genetic behavioral arguments. Part Three addresses the important question of what the
criminal courts should do, faced with the uncertainties inherent in genetic science. It
concludes that expert testimony in criminal cases deserves at least the gatekeeping
scrutiny given to expert testimony in civil cases; this is far too important an area to be
left to the ad hoc avoidance techniques currently prevalent in our justice system.
II. THE CIVIL COURTS GRAPPLE WITH GENETIC SCIENCE
Toxic tort plaintiffs face great difficulties in establishing causation. Both general
and specific causation are usually contested, exposure levels are difficult to establish,
and genetic testimony is being used to overcome these obstacles.2 1 Now that gene
expression assays have become relatively cheap (hundreds of dollars) and quick (several
days), we can expect to see increased use of testimony about chromosomal
translocations, which indicate exposure (though not to what), changes in gene
expression, protein concentration, and the presence of metabolites.
2 2
The welding fumes cases23 offer a good example of judicial gatekeeping of expert
genetic testimony. There, plaintiffs suffering from Parkinson's disease claimed that their
exposure to manganese fumes from welding triggered their injuries. 24 In a well-
reasoned opinion, the court addressed the defendants' Daubert motions, seeking to
exclude plaintiffs' experts on a variety of bases, but primarily because each expert was
unqualified to testify about the complex issues involved. 25 In particular, the defendants
objected to the plaintiffs' toxicologist, who proposed to explain the mechanism of
manganese absorption and its effects on the body, including injury to the central nervous
system.26 This part of the testimony the court ruled admissible, but when the expert
proposed to testify about the interplay of genetics with the environment in the etiology of
Marker, 22 Chem. 193 (1998) (discussing Wells v. Shell Oil Co. and defense arguments that the absence of
biomarkers in plaintiffs' blood showed that benzene could not have caused plaintiffs' acute myelogenous
leukemia because benzene-caused disease shows breaks in the fifth and seventh chromosomes, which this
plaintiff did not have) with Lavendar v. Bayer Corp., No. 93-C-226-k (W. Va. Cir. May 5, 1998) (rejecting
same defense without evidence that absence of biomarkers excluded benzene as a cause).
20. See Barrow, 1998 WL 812318 (excluding plaintiffs' expert's biomarker testimony as insufficient to
establish causation in light of defense expert testimony that the same biomarker can be found in women
without silicone implants).
21. See Marchant, supra n. 3, at 19-20.
22. See e.g. Mark Hansen, DNA Poised to Show its Civil Side, ABA J. 18-19 (Mar. 2008) (discovering the
use of cytokine testing as sort of "genetic fingerprints" to determine whether chemical exposure caused
plaintiff's harm).
23. In re Welding Fume Prod Liab. Litig., 2006 WL 4507859.
24. Id. at *2.
25. Id.
26. Id.at**10-11.
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Parkinson's, the court remarked that merely reading the literature does not make
someone an expert, and that "a given expert's tendency to opine about areas outside his
particular expertise does not... disqualify him from testifying about his true, core area
of expert knowledge." 27 The plaintiffs statistics expert also proposed to testify about
genetic data, and to critique the defense's epidemiology studies on a statistical basis.
2 8
This, the court found admissible. An extensive analysis of the expertise of each of the
proffered experts and their areas of expertise followed, and each of plaintiffs' experts
was permitted to testify, but with certain limitations.
29
A similarly thorough analysis was undertaken by the Third Circuit in the TMI
Litigation30 with respect to radiation biomarker testimony, although the court ultimately
excluded the plaintiffs' testimony because plaintiffs had been tested beyond the two-year
limit for which the tests were reliable. 31 Because plaintiffs could not directly establish
their radiation levels, they had attempted to demonstrate exposure through the
concentration of dicentric chromosomes in lymphocytes in order to establish exposure to
radiation. 32  While the court in principle endorsed the counting of dicentric
chromosomes to establish both radiation exposure and dose, it found no evidence that
this was a reliable test beyond the two years for which it had been studied (the plaintiffs
were not tested until fifteen years after exposure).3 3 The court also excluded evidence of
a more stable biomarker for radiation exposure, the FISH test, as having been untimely
presented.
34
Yet another example of the courts' painstaking analyses in civil cases can be found
in the silicone breast implant cases, where plaintiffs argued that they were genetically
susceptible to adverse reactions in order to overcome epidemiological studies showing
that there was no doubling of the risk (as generally required to demonstrate causation).35
This was admissible evidence in some cases, but excluded where plaintiffs could not
show which gene had predisposed them to silicone reactions in Hall v. Baxter Health
Care Corporation.3 6 In each of theses cases, judges carefully analyzed the testimony
presented. They considered the expertise of the expert and the basis for the proffered
testimony. They permitted testimony in some areas and excluded some testimony as
beyond the expertise of the expert or as unsupported.
The cases with the most sophisticated approach to genetic testimony, however, are
vaccine cases, which are not even required to apply Daubert in their analyses. 37 The
27. Id. at *6.
28. Inre Welding Fume Prod. Liab. Litig.,2006 WL 4507859 at **15-16.
29. Id at **6-22.
30. In re TMLitig., 193 F.3d 613 (3d Cir. 1999).
31. Id. at 690-93.
32. Id. at 690.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 692-93.
35. See Marchant, supra, n. 3, at 25-26.
36. 947 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Or. 1998). See also Stone v. Williamson, 2007 WL 1135686 (Mich. App. Apr.
17, 2007) (excluding defense expert testimony of genetic predisposition in a medical malpractice action for
lack of evidence that the plaintiff had this predisposition).
37. See e.g. Hopkins v. Sec. of Health & Hum. Servs., 2007 WL 2454038 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 10, 2007)
(explaining the procedural stance of a case brought under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program).
2007]
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context is different from an admissibility decision, in that the question before the court is
causation rather than admissibility. 38 Many of these cases do explicitly apply a Daubert
standard and analysis, however, and even those that do not, tend to use a sound reasoning
methodology. 39 In order to prevail under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation
Program,4 ° a plaintiff must either suffer from a vaccine-related injury listed as a
statutorily presumed cause, or prove that the vaccine was the cause in fact of the harm
41suffered. Quite frequently, vaccine plaintiffs claim that the vaccine was an
environmental trigger that activated an underlying predisposition to a particular
disease.
42
In analyzing the plaintiffs' claims, the court determines whether the expert's
testimony exceeds the scope of expertise demonstrated, and summarizes each expert's
position.43  In addition, the court reviews the literature relied upon by the expert,
assesses whether the literature supports the expert's testimony, and makes a decision.
The court's reasoning is thus clear, accessible, and accountable. 44 If courts are looking
for a good model for making sound Daubert decisions, they could do far worse.
III. CIRCUMVENTING ANALYSIS IN THE CRIMINAL COURTS
The central problem for the criminal courts is the lack of a coherent theoretical
basis for admitting or excluding expert genetic testimony. In civil cases, the underlying
theory making genetic testimony relevant is causation: That an environmental stimulus
(such as a chemical produced by the defendant) can trigger genetic predisposition to
disease (or alternatively, that the environmental trigger was irrelevant to genetically
predisposed disease). For criminal cases, this theory is a non sequitur in a system that
sees crime as a chosen course of action rather than a disease. Moreover, the notion of a
genetic predisposition comes dangerously close to prohibited propensity evidence-the
danger of conflating a propensity to act in a certain way with having acted that way on a
given occasion.45 This is a valid concern, but not one that the courts explicitly rely on in
their analyses. Nor does it affect the majority of genetic testimony, which is proffered in
mitigation, or to substantiate some mental illness (either for the insanity defense or that
falls short of legal insanity but negates intent).
38. Id. at **8-9.
39. Id.
40. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300aa-10 to 300aa-19 (West Supp. 2003).
41. Hopkins, 2007 WL 2454038 at *8.
42. See e.g. Hopkins, 2207 WL 1135686 (hearing loss); Stevens v. Sec. of Health & Hum. Servs., 2006 WL
659525 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 24, 2006) (multiple sclerosis); Bubb v. Sec. of Health & Hum. Servs., 2005 WL 1025707
(Fed. CI. Apr. 29, 2005) (multiple sclerosis); Lee v. Sec. of Health & Hum. Servs., 2005 WL 1125672 (Fed. Cl.
May 6, 2005) (fibromyalgia); Ryman v. Sec. of Health & Hum. Servs., 65 Fed. Cl. 35 (2005) (rheumatoid
arthritis).
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. For example, it is difficult to see how the court-appointed expert's testimony that defendant had a
"genetic predisposition to psychopathy" that was "essentially untreatable" helped the defendant in People v.
Smith, 150 P.3d 1224, 1234 (Cal. 2007).
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A. Policy Exclusions
There are few more well established links than those between genes and alcohol
and between alcohol and violence.46 Defense lawyers frequently attempt to draw on this
connection to violent behavior, either to negate mens rea (in those jurisdictions that have
not abolished this defense 4 7) or in mitigation.4 8  Because only a few states permit
alcohol or drug abuse to negate intent, or to be a mitigating circumstance in sentencing,
however, it is rarely admissible.49  Thus, some of the strongest genetic evidence is
typically inadmissible for policy reasons.
50
In addition to the overt policy determinations that derive from legislation, courts
make a number of policy-based determinations when they exclude genetic testimony as
confusing, or redundant. The most common basis for exclusion is that expert testimony
is redundant of family history testimony, which can be obtained from lay witnesses
(family members, for example). 51 In this, the courts are mistaken, however, because
family testimony about behavioral abnormalities is no more sufficient to establish
genetic disease than it would be when any other kind of illness is at issue. Expert
testimony is needed to give the fact finder important context, diagnosing and explaining
the illness. Family testimony may give information for mitigation, but it does little to
explain the significance of biology to the act for which the defendant is being tried or
sentenced.
Refusal of the courts to order testing is another of these judicially created policy
based exclusions. As soon as studies linking XYY chromosomal abnormalities with
criminal propensities became available in the 1970s, defense attorneys attempted to use
them to argue that their clients should be exonerated. In the United States, the few cases
that attempted such a genetic defense were unsuccessful. 52 In each of these cases, the
46. See Laura A. Baker et al., Behvaioral Genetics: The Science ofAntisocial Behavior, 69 L. & Contemp.
Probs. 7, 29 (2006) (noting that although well studied, the relationship is not well understood).
47. See e.g. Clarke v. Ariz., 548 U.S. 735 (2006) (upholding Arizona's right to preclude expert testimony
about mens rea).
48. See e.g. People v. Mertz, 842 N.E.2d 618, 644-45 (Ill. 2005) (defense expert testified that defendant
had genetic predisposition to alcohol dependence and mood disorder); State v. Manning, 885 So. 2d 1044,
1096-97 (La. 2004), cert. denied, Manning v. La., 544 U.S. 967 (2005) (defense psychiatrist proffered
mitigation testimony regarding alcohol problems that may have stemmed from a genetic predisposition).
49. See e.g. Mont. v. Egelhoff 518 U.S. 37, 56 (1996) (upholding the Montana legislature's right to exclude
evidence of intoxication as a defense to any offense unless the defendant did not know the substance was
intoxicating).
50. Even where there is no legislative prohibition on substance abuse testimony, courts may preclude it as
ambiguous. See e.g. Jones v. Schriro, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1044-45 (finding no ineffective assistance for
failure to develop neuropsychological testimony about defendant's genetic predisposition to alcoholism).
51. See e.g. Schurz v. Schriro, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22326 at **32-36 (D. Ariz. Sept. 29, 2005)
(acknowledging that genetic predisposition to alcoholism testimony should have been developed as mitigation
testimony but declining to find ineffective assistance because it would have been cumulative of family history
that was presented through lay witnesses).
52. See State v. Spivey, 692 N.E.2d 151, 165-66 (Ohio 1998) (defense expert diagnosed defendant as
having XYY syndrome and testified that this chromosomal abnormality put defendant at risk for committing
criminal acts); People v. Tanner, 91 Cal. Rptr. 656, 658-59 (App. 2d Dist. 1970) (finding that neither the link
to aggressive behavior nor a chromosomal contribution to legal insanity were established); Millard v. State, 261
A.2d 227, 228 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1970) (upholding trial court's refusal to submit the genetic issue to the jury
because the expert failed to demonstrate a link between the XYY condition and the legal definition of insanity);
People v. Yukl, 372 N.Y.S.2d 313, 317-20 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (refusing to order genetic testing or to permit
defendant's father to pay for genetic testing because the evidence of a genetic link to violence was not reliably
2007]
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courts considered the link between genes and violence too attenuated, and either refused
to order genetic testing of the defendant, 53 or refused to submit the genetic issue to the
jury. 54
Defendants with arguments based on stronger science have not fared any better.
More sophisticated studies of genetic anomalies and their link to crime were at issue in
Mobley v. State,55 where the defense attempted to obtain expert testimony to mitigate the
sentence of a capital murder defendant on the basis of monoamine oxidase A (MAOA)
abnormality, an attempt that was also unsuccessful. The defendant came from a family
that had been troubled with serious behavioral problems for generations, and the defense
sought to obtain genetic testing information for use as mitigation evidence. 56  The
defendant appealed his murder conviction based on the trial court's failure to order
genetic testing.57  The Georgia Supreme Court rejected the appeal, finding that the
scientific basis for a genetic link was too uncertain. 5 8 New counsel, filing a habeas
petition, claimed that Mobley's former counsel was ineffective for, among other reasons,
declining an offer from Mobley's father to pay for the testing. 59 While the habeas court
vacated, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed, reinstated the sentence on appeal, and
denied reconsideration, explaining that no expert testimony would be needed because
Mobley's father's cousin's testimony about the family history of behavioral problems
was sufficient to present the "genetics theory." 6° Such an approach--declining to hear
expert causation testimony because lay testimony had been presented-would be
difficult to imagine in a civil case.
Not only do the courts foreclose the possibility of expert testimony by refusing
requests for testing, but they are largely unsympathetic to claims that expert testimony
should have been developed, but was not. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for
failure to develop the genetic aspect of the defense have rarely been successful.
Landrigan v. Stewart involved an ineffective assistance claim, for failing to present
mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of the petitioner's capital murder trial.
Unlike Mobley, there was no family history testimony. The petitioner had refused to
permit his birth mother or ex-wife to testify about the family history of alcoholism and
behavioral problems. The petitioner contended, however, that he would have cooperated
had the attorneys presented expert evidence that his "biological background made him
what he is."
62
established); State v. Roberts, 544 P.2d 754, 758-59 (Wash. App. Div. 3 1976) (affirming trial court's denial of
genetic testing because of the uncertain causal connection between XYY and criminal conduct).
53. Yukl, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 317-20; Roberts, 544 P.2d at 758-79.
54. Tanner, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 659-60; Millard, 261 A.2d at 232.
55. See Turpin v. Mobley, 502 S.E.2d 458, 465-66 (Ga. 1998) (finding no ineffective assistance of counsel
in failing to accept defendant's father's offer to pay for genetic testing for MAOA deficiency analysis after the
trial court refused to pay for it).
56. See Deborah W. Denno, Revisiting the Legal Link between Genetics and Crime, 69 L. & Contemp.
Probs. 209, 209 (2006) (discussing Mobley v. State, 455 S.E.2d 61 (Ga. 1995)).
57. Mobley, 455 S.E.2d 61.
58. Id. at 66.
59. Turpin, 502 S.E.2d at 463.
60. Id. at 465-66.
61. 272 F.3d 1221, 1224 (9th Cir. 2001).
62. Id. at 1228.
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The available evidence that his counsel could have developed and presented at
Landrigan's sentencing hearing, but did not, include the facts that Landrigan had an
organic brain disorder, had been abandoned by his alcoholic mother at six months, and
adopted by alcoholic parents; his biological father was on death row in Arkansas for
capital murder; and that Landrigan's substance abuse began at an early age. The en banc
appeals court noted that, subsequent to Landrigan's conviction and sentencing, an expert
had done a thorough neuropsychosocial evaluation, concluding that Landrigan's genetic
makeup, in utero exposure to teratogenic substances, early matemal rejection, and his
troubled interactions with his adoptive family resulted in disordered behavior that was
beyond his control and left him unable to function in a society that expects individuals to
operate in an organized and adaptive manner. 63 Defense counsel had failed to uncover
any of this information, despite the obligation to conduct a thorough background
investigation.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, upholding the district court's
determination that even with an evidentiary hearing, Landrigan would not be entitled to
habeas relief.64 Characterizing the omitted mitigation evidence as "weak," the Court
determined that Landrigan had waived his right to mitigating evidence by his refusal to
permit his mother or ex-wife to testify about the family history. Because the expert
testimony "would not have changed the result," the failure to present it was not
ineffective assistance.
65
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, dissented,
explaining that it was not until years after his conviction that Landrigan even learned
about his organic brain disease, that the reason he did not know about it was that his
counsel had failed to investigate, and that for the majority to assume he would have
refused to permit such testimony was "pure guesswork." 66 Curiously, both majority and
dissent in Landrigan agreed that counsel's assistance was ineffective. They disagreed
about whether the failure to present the omitted testimony would have made any
difference. The majority thought not. The dissent thought that there was enough of a
question to put it to the jury.
Both Mobley and Landrigan illustrate two erroneous judicial assumptions about
expert testimony concerning genetic influences. First, as noted previously, the Court
assumed that family history is redundant of expert testimony, which is (or should be)
incorrect. There can be many reasons for a family history of violence. If some of them
are biological, rather than lifestyle choices, that evidence should be presented to the jury.
Second, the Court assumed that the jury would be confused about the evidence, that it
would hurt as much as help the defendant. While judges may be correct that reasonable
people may differ about what inferences to draw, that does not mean that they should
take the question from the jury. It is precisely when reasonable people can differ that the
voice of the community is most important. Whether this evidence hurts or helps is a
quintessential jury question, and the evidence should be presented for their
63. Landrigan v. Schriro, 441 F.3d 638, 645 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 1933 (2007).
64. Schriro v. Landrigan, 127 S. Ct. 1933.
65. Id. at 1943-44.
66. Id. at 1944 (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
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determination.
B. Negating Mens Rea
Very seldom is genetic testimony proffered at the guilt stage of the trial. Even
when it is, it has been met with some skepticism by juries. For example, in State v.
Payne,67 a molecular neurobiologist testified about the relationship of neurotransmitters
(specifically serotonin) to impulsive violence. 68 The jury was instructed on the elements
of first degree (premeditated) murder, second degree (knowingly killing another), and
voluntary manslaughter (killing under the influence of passion under adequate
provocation) as well as on diminished capacity. 69 Rather than convict on first degree
murder, with which the defendant had been charged, the jury convicted the defendant of
second degree murder, in what might be seen as a compromise verdict.70 The trial court
also considered the expert testimony in mitigation at sentencing, but found it a slight
factor that did not excuse or mitigate the defendant's conduct, because it did not consider
the crimes he committed to be impulsive. 71 On appeal, the court upheld the conviction.
Nonetheless, one might view the expert testimony as having had some impact on the
jury.
Judges are also skeptical about the inferences that can be drawn from genetic
testimony. In one case where the appellate court acknowledged that there had been plain
error in the jury instructions on voluntary intoxication to negate mens rea, the court
nonetheless held it to be harmless. Although the issue had been adequately raised by an
addiction expert testifying about the effects of methamphetamine, including the genetic
basis for addiction, the court nonetheless held that "no reasonable juror could have
concluded, based on the entire record in this case.., that [defendant] did not deliberately
intend to kill [the victim]." 72
Just as genetic testimony is used in civil cases to demonstrate exposure through
biomarkers that would not occur in the absence of exposure, connecting genetic
anomalies to mental conditions appears to be a prevalent use of genetic testimony. 73 For
example, in State v. Sexton, 74 the defendant proffered genetic testimony to negate mens
rea, that his drug use had triggered a latent pre-existing mental illness. 75 The defendant
had voluntarily ingested L.S.D. two or three weeks before killing a complete stranger
67. 2002 WL 31624813 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 20, 2002) (upholding conviction for second degree
murder).
68. Id. at **4-6.
69. Id. at*13.
70. Id. at *1.
71. Id. at **17-18.
72. Malone v. State, 168 P.3d 185, 203 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007).
73. See e.g. State v. Hughanks, 792 N.E.2d 1081, 1103 (Ohio 2003) (genetic tendency to mental illness);
Davis v. State, 2004 WL 253396 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 11, 2004) (involving expert defense testimony of a
genetic predisposition for mental illness); Cauthern v. State, 145 S.W.3d 571, 588 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004)
(defense psychiatrist attempting to present evidence of a genetic predisposition to impulsive behavior); State v.
Maraschiello, 88 S.W.3d 586, 599 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) (defense trial testimony that defendant probably
had a genetic predisposition to delusional disorders).
74. 904 A.2d 1092 (Vt. 2006) (upholding defendant's right to present evidence regarding diminished
capacity but not insanity).
75. Id. at 1096.
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who happened to be riding by his house on her bicycle, because, as defendant told the
expert, he was feeling an urge to "kill people and 'gather their souls." '76 The court-
appointed psychiatrist concluded that the defendant was insane at the time of the offense,
resulting from a substance-induced psychosis or from a previously undiagnosed
schizophrenic disorder triggered by the substance abuse. 77 Because of the prohibition on
using voluntary substance abuse as an excuse, the Vermont Supreme Court held that the
defendant was entitled to present this evidence as relevant to mens rea, but could not
assert an insanity defense on its basis.
78
C. Mitigation Testimony
Most capital cases to date that have attempted to bring in genetics testimony have
done so in the context of mitigation during the penalty phase of the case, rather than at
the guilt phase of the proceedings. 79  One reason for the predominance of genetic
testimony at the sentencing stage is that the admissibility standards for mitigating
evidence during sentencing are fairly generous. In a capital case, any relevant evidence
is admissible in mitigation. Although Daubert explained that to be relevant, scientific
evidence must demonstrate its validity,8 1 in most of the recent cases involving genetics
testimony, if the defense presents such evidence in mitigation, the court has found it
admissible. 82 As a practical matter, even when freely admissible, genetic predisposition
83testimony does not appear to help the defendants much. The proffered testimony is
rarely scrutinized for scientific validity, and is generally admitted. It rarely does the
defendant much good, either, since the jury has already convicted for a heinous crime.84
Part of the reason that genetic testimony in mitigation is so ineffective may stem
from the way it is presented. Rather than a molecular neurobiologist, like the expert who
76. Id. at 1095.
77. Id. at 1096.
78. Id. at 1099-1111.
79. See Denno, supra n. 55, at 221 (observing that "genetics evidence is submitted primarily as a mitigating
factor in death penalty cases rather than as a defense relating to the defendant's level of culpability at the trial
court level" and noting that admissibility criteria for mitigating evidence are more flexible than those used in
defenses).
80. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 327-28 (1989) (explaining that "the jury must be allowed to consider
and give effect to mitigating evidence relevant to a defendant's character or record or the circumstances of the
offense"); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 394, 399 (1987); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)
(plurality opinion).
81. Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993).
82. See e.g. Manning, 885 So. 2d at 1096-97 (defendant's expert testified during sentencing that the
defendant's alcohol problems and low mental ability may have stemmed from a genetic predisposition);
Hughbanks, 792 N.E.2d at 1104 (finding mitigating factors, including psychiatrist's testimony about inherent
mental disease, outweighed by aggravating factors).
83. See e.g. Stevens v. State, 770 N.E.2d 739, 754-55 (Ind. 2002) (defendant sentenced to death despite
mitigating evidence about defendant's genetic predisposition); Hughbanks, 792 N.E.2d at 1104 (genetic
testimony regarding inherent mental disorder was outweighed by aggravating circumstances); but see Arausa v.
State, 2003 WL 21803322 at *2 (Tex. App. Aug. 6, 2003) (finding that trial court had not erred in declining to
appoint defense psychiatrist to develop mitigating evidence on genetic predisposition to violence among
victims of abuse).
84. See Erica Beecher-Monas, Evaluating Scientific Evidence: An Interdisciplinary Framework for
Intellectual Due Process 150 (Cambridge U. Press 2007) (discussing the impact of cognitive dissonance on
jury sentencing decisions).
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testified in Payne, most genetic testimony in mitigation is proffered by psychologists
who have no particular expertise in genetics, and who testify in only the most general
way about how the family history of violence demonstrates a genetic predisposition in
the defendant.
85
IV. WHAT SHOULD COURTS Do WITH GENETIC INFORMATION?
What is the relevance of a biological predisposition to acts of violence or sexual
violence? Does a genetic link to crime negate mens rea, constitute evidence for a legal
defense, like insanity, or is it a mitigating circumstance calling for more lenient
sentencing? 86 Does it mean that the defendant is not responsible, is less responsible, or
does it affect responsibility at all? Or is the Landrigan majority correct that genetic
testimony will only confirm the jury's inclination to see the defendant as "bad to the
bone?" These are important questions, and implicate important constitutional concerns,
like the right of the defendant to present a complete defense, and the necessity of the
jury's hearing all the information it needs to make a reasoned moral judgment about
imposing the death penalty.
Legal liability for crime is a two-part inquiry: actus reus (the voluntary act) and
mens rea (the intent necessary to commit the act).87 The question of whether expert
testimony can help the jury decide whether the defendant had the requisite intent is
extremely controversial. 88  There are various defenses (insanity is one) that may
implicate genetic information. In addition, the sentence of the convicted defendant will
depend on the assessment of personal culpability. Genetic testimony has been proffered
as relevant to all of these elements. 89 Because the standards for relevance are broad (any
tendency to make a fact of consequence to the issues at trial more or less probable),
expert genetics testimony has rarely been excluded on this basis. Instead, the courts use
other circumventing gambits to keep it from the jury.
Not all genetic testimony should be admitted. Quite a bit of expert testimony
proffered in criminal cases is conclusory and unscientific. The courts ought to keep such
testimony out. After the Supreme Court's Daubert trilogy of cases, the question for
admissibility of scientific evidence now is whether the testimony has met the standards
85. See e.g. Berryman v. Ayers, 2007 WL 1992049 at *87 (E.D. Cal. July 10, 2007) (denying evidentiary
hearing where new evidence was proffered by clinical psychologist and psychiatrist who proposed to testify to
a predisposition to alcoholism and this was cumulative of family testimony); Manning, 885 So. 2d at 1097
(psychological testimony that capital defendant was a slow learner with genetic propensity to alcoholism);
Hughbanks, 792 N.E.2d at 1101 (mitigation testimony at capital sentencing proffered by psychiatrist testifying
that the defendant had a genetic tendency toward schizophrenia, based on his father's paranoid schizophrenia).
86. See Nita A. Farahany & James E. Coleman, Jr., Genetics and Responsibility: To Know the Criminal
from the Crime, 69 L. & Contemp. Probs. 115, 146 (2006) (distinguishing between mens rea, defined as mental
culpability, and the excuse of insanity). The authors opine that "[a] successful claim that a defendant lacks the
capacity to form mens rea is hard to imagine." Id. at 125.
87. See Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law § 5.1, 239 (4th ed., West 2003). Some crimes do not require
proof of mens rea, but those crimes are not those in which genetic testimony is typically involved.
88. See e.g. Clark, 548 U.S. 735 (finding exclusion of expert testimony regarding mens rea constitutional).
89. See Farahany & Coleman, supra n. 85, at 163 (concluding that "genetic predisposition evidence is
irrelevant to both liability and the defenses of justifications and excuses, it should have little role in the
negation or mitigation of a defendant's criminal liability"). Notably, Professors Farahany and Coleman do not
contend that proffered expert testimony has been widely excluded on the basis of relevance. Rather, they argue
that the criminal law currently "has no place ... for behavioral genetics evidence." Id. at 149.
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and methods of science. 90 If anything, there should be more judicial screening of the
expert testimony proffered in these cases. Most of the genetics testimony cases involved
psychologists testifying that because there was a family history of bad behavior, and that
because the defendant exhibited some of the symptoms associated with a particular
anomaly, there might be a chromosomal anomaly to account for it.9 1 Leaving such
testimony to psychologists untrained in genetics, and without specific testing that could
be expected to link the anomaly to the defendant may be a tactical problem for these
defenses. The courts ought to demand more. As the Supreme Court explained in
Daubert, the requirement that expert testimony be helpful to the jury, "supported by
appropriate validation-i.e., 'good grounds,' based on what is known," is a condition of
relevance.
92
But the kind of sophisticated evaluation involved in a case like Landrigan,93 where
the neuropsychological evaluation discussed the convergence of factors including the
defendant's "genetic makeup, in utero exposure to teratogenic substances, early maternal
rejection, and his troubled interactions with his adoptive family" is difficult to dismiss as
unscientific. Indeed, rather than any lack of science, the Supreme Court in Landrigan
was concerned that the testimony would not have helped the defendant. This is a major
controversy, but it is not the province of the judge. Precisely because reasonable minds
can differ on the inference to be drawn from evidence of a genetic predisposition it
should be submitted to the jury.
Similarly, in Payne,94 where a molecular neurobiologist testified about the role of
serotonin in impulsive violence, and had tested the defendant's serotonin levels as
compared to a control group, and found them very low, the evidence appeared to be well
supported.9 5 It would probably have met Daubert standards, had there been an inquiry.
And it had at least some effect on jury deliberations, since they declined to convict on
premeditation. That such well supported testimony is rare is all the more reason for
courts to demand more exacting standards from the scientists that testify before them.
A. How Valid is the Science?
There has been considerable research on the biology of violence, and the complex
way environmental stimuli affect gene expression. Despite strong evidence that the
90. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) (extending the validity inquiry to
technical as well as scientific evidence); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997) (citing Daubert,
509 U.S. at 589); Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579 (requiring judicial gatekeeping for scientific validity).
91. See e.g. Hall, 160 S.W.3d at 33 (school psychologist testified that the defendant's physical appearance
and other characteristics indicated a genetic disorder "such as XXY, Kleinfelter Syndrome, YYX, Extra Y
Chromosome; or Fragile X Syndrome").
92. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590. Even in state courts that have eschewed the Daubert standard in favor of the
old general acceptance rule, and in proceedings where the rules of evidence do not apply, there is an increased
concern with scientific validity. See e.g. Lee v. Health & Hum. Servs., 2005 WL 1125672 (Fed. Cl. Apr. 8,
2005) (finding testimony of genetic predisposition to fibromyalgia admissible under Daubert, although
acknowledging that the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to proceedings under the National Vaccine
Compensation Program).
93. Landrigan, 441 F.3d at 645.
94. 2002 WL 31624813.
95. Id. at *13.
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cycle of violence is repeated across generations, 96 it is highly unlikely that anyone will
discover a "crime gene." The interaction between genes and the environment is too
complex for such a simplistic view. That does not mean, however, that biology is
irrelevant in assessing criminality.
97
Scandinavian twin and adoption studies are often cited as favoring a genetic role in
crime. 98 Studies of petty criminals in Sweden and Denmark, for example, observed that
the biological parents of petty criminals-but not the adoptive parents-had increased
rates of criminality over the population base rate.99  Notably, these studies did not
examine violent crime specifically, but included any criminal infractions as an
outcome.100 None of the adoption studies have reported an association between violent
convictions and parental background, although one study showed that it was more likely
in identical (monozygotic) twins than in fraternal (dizygotic) twins, for both twins to
have violent convictions.
101
XYY chromosome abnormality studies, once cited as evidence of "crime genes,"
have been shown at most to have an indirect link to (property, but not violent) crime
through mental retardation. 10 2 The MAOA studies are more promising. In these, alleles
of specific genes have been identified and linked with propensities to violence.10 3
96. See e.g. Natil. Inst. of Just., The Cycle of Violence Revisited, http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/cyclepre.pdf
(Feb. 1996) (studying 1,575 subjects over a 26-year period, and concluding that abused and neglected children
were twice as likely to be arrested as juveniles as children without such a history, and more likely to be arrested
for a violent offense).
97. See Debra Niehoff, The Biology of Violence: How Understanding the Brain, Behavior, and
Environment Can Break the Vicious Circle ofAggression 238 (Free Press 1999). For a critical perspective, see
Kenneth A. Taylor, On the Explanatory Limits of Behavioral Genetics, in Genetics and Criminal Behavior,
supra n. 13, at 117-39.
98. See e.g. Terrie E. Moffitt & Avshalom Caspi, Evidence from Behavioral Genetics for Environmental
Contributions to Antisocial Conduct, in Crime and Schizophrenia: Causes and Cures 45, 47 (Adrian Raine ed.,
Nova Sci. 2006) (noting that genes influence 40-50% of the variation in antisocial behavior, and citing twin and
adoption studies); Niehoff, supra n. 96, at 238 (noting that "twin and adoption data favor a role for genetic
influences" in crime but cautioning that "when concordance rates for violent crimes were extracted from the
Scandinavian data, none of the studies made a very convincing case for an appreciable genetic influence on
violence"). Cf Matt Ridley, The Agile Gene: How Nature Turns on Nature 83 (Harper Collins 2003) (noting
that twin studies demonstrate that "personality is about as heritable as body weight").
99. Niehoff, supra n. 96, at 238. The theory underlying these studies was that if the environment was the
important variable rather than inheritance, the rate should have been higher with both sets of parents.
100. Id
101. C. R. Cloninger & I. I. Gottesman, Genetic and Environmental Factors in Antisocial Behavior
Disorders, in The Causes of Crime: New Biological Approaches 92, 96-101 (S. A. Mednick et al. eds.,
Cambridge U. Press 1987).
102. See Owen D. Jones, Behavioral Genetics and Crime, in Context, 69 L. & Contemp. Probs. 81, 91 n. 36,
91-92 (2006) (noting that the XYY abnormality has at most an indirect link to these individuals' increased risk
of arrest and conviction).
103. MAOA regulates neurotransmitters such as serotonin, dopamine, and epinephrine, and has been
associated with psychopathy, childhood hyperactivity, childhood aggression, impulsivity, and substance abuse.
See Grant T. Harris et al., The Construct of Psychopathy, 28 Crime & Just. 197, 224 (2001) (acknowledging
that "findings on all of these laboratory-based theories of psychopathy often seem somewhat ephemeral"). See
also Avshalom Caspi et al., Role of Genotype in the Cycle of Violence in Maltreated Children, 297 Sci. 851,
851-53 (2002) (studying 442 men in New Zealand for differences in MAOA activity alleles and correlating
these differences with maltreatment in childhood and subsequent violent behavior). The results demonstrated
that the high activity form of the gene did not manifest in violent propensities even if the men had been
mistreated as boys, while those with the low-active form of the gene, who had been mistreated, committed four
times as many rapes, assaults, and robberies as the average. Id.
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1. The Role of Neurotransmitters in Violence
Violence most certainly has biochemical correlates. Abnormal neurotransmitter
levels, serotonin in particular, long have been associated with violent crime. 10 4
Serotonin is a neurotransmitter that regulates inhibitory mechanisms of the central
nervous system, and is thought to mediate conditions ranging from depression to
impulsive violence. 105 Specific genes that appear to regulate neurotransmitter activity
have been identified, as has the gene for tryptophan, a precursor of serotonin. 10 6
Monoamine oxidase A and B are enzymes that metabolize these neurotransmitters, and
abnormal levels of these enzymes have been linked to risky and impulsive behaviors. 10 7
However, there is some evidence that serotonin levels affect mental function generally,
so that rather than a propensity for violence, affected people simply lack constructive
outlets for aggression, and are less adept at concealing it. 1
08
2. Stress Responses
People have different levels of stress response, and while some of this difference
may be due to genetic differences among individuals, the differences may also be
environmentally determined, may be due to traumatic brain injury, or may be a
combination. Moreover, gene expression may be "turned on" or "off' by life events.
For example, a gene called 5-HTT is associated with depression, suicide, and
aggression. 109 But unless people carrying the predisposing allele are exposed to life
events that they perceive as stressful, they are no more likely to become depressed than
people with the healthy allele.
Environmental factors play a role in altering gene expression. For example, the
expression of a gene in rats that makes them fearful and jumpy can be altered by how
regularly the mother licks and grooms the pups.110 If mom licks and grooms frequently,
the "jumpy" gene expression is changed so that the rat grows up to be calm and curious.
This and other examples of developmental "plasticity" show that a given genotype can
develop in different ways depending on the environment. Moreover, any neural deficits
(developmental or traumatic) seem to become more pronounced when infants are
deprived of care or nutrition. It may well be that "neuropsychological impairments
104. See Graham A. Rogeness et al., Neurochemistry and Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 31 J. Am. Acad.
Child & Adolescent Psych. 765, 775-77 (1992).
105. Wasserman & Wachbroit, supra n. 13, at 10 (discussing the Brunner 1993 study of MAOA).
106. See Richard A. Glennon & Malgorzata Dukat, Serotonin Receptor Subtypes, in Psychopharmacology:
The Fourth Generation of Progress 415, 421 (Floyd E. Bloom & David J. Kupfer eds., Raven Press 1995)
(discussing the role of serotonin and the serotonergic genes); Baker, supra n. 45, at 34 (noting that several
genes associated with nuerotransmitters have been identified in quantitative trait loci studies); Frederic Sandou
et al., Enhanced Aggressive Behavior in Mice Lacking 5-HTIB Receptor, 265 Sci. 1875, 1875-78 (1994)
(observing aggressive behavior in mice).
107. J. C. Shih et al., Monoamine Oxidase: From Genes to Behavior, 22 Annual Rev. Neuroscience 197,
209-10 (1999).
108. See Evan Balaban et al., Mean Genes and the Biology of Aggression: A Critical Review of Recent
Animal and Human Research, 11 J. Neurogenetics 1, 18 (1996).
109. See Avshalom Caspi, Influence of Life Stress on Depression: Moderation by a Polymorphism in the 5-
HTT Gene, 301 Sci. 386, 386 (2003).
110. E.W. Fish et.al., Epigenic Programming of Stress Responses Through Variations in Maternal Care,
1036 Annals N.Y. Acad. Sci. 167, 167 (2004).
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disrupt normal development and increase vulnerability" to poor social environments.Ill
That is, the environment can elicit markedly different traits from the same DNA.
Depression, violent aggression, and antisocial personality disorder have all been
linked to problems with the stress response. 1 12 And while some violent criminals have
lowered central nervous system (CNS) and autonomic nervous system (ANS) arousal,
others have heightened arousal. 113  Brain, body, genes, hormones, and hormone
receptors are intimately interconnected and responsive to environmental conditions.
Although each of these disorders has a different pattern of expression, all are associated
with abnormal endocrine feedback, norepinephrine and serotonin functions, and altered
glucocorticoid levels.1 14  This suggests that inappropriately violent behavior may
sometimes involve a stress response disorder. People who appear to lack a conscience
may actually lack the biological machinery necessary to warn them that they are heading
for disaster.115  Studies of recidivistic violent offenders, adults with antisocial
personality disorder, and antisocial adolescents have all documented statistically
significant reductions in levels of cortisol, which is the main circulating stress
hormone. 116  Testosterone levels also appear to sensitize males to the social
environment, affecting levels of aggression. 117
111. James C. Howell & J. David Hawkins, Prevention of Youth Violence, 24 Crime & Just. 263, 268 (1998)
(citing Terrie E. Moffitt, Adolescence-Limited and Life-Course-Persistent Antisocial Behavior: A
Developmental Taxonomy, 100 Psychol. Rev. 674, 674-701 (1993)).
112. Niehoffsupra n. 96, at 183.
113. Id. at 181. The normal human CNS displays immediate, short-term, instinctive reflexive activity as a
first line of defense to real or perceived threats. Measures of antisocial behavior in fifteen year-old males have
been correlated with reduced autonomic nervous system activation. See Adrian Raine et al., Autonomic
Nervous System Factors Underlying Disinhibited, Antisocial, and Violent Behavior: Biosocial Perspectives and
Treatment Implications, 794 Annals N.Y. Acad. Sci. 46, 48 (1996) (reviewing nine-year prospective study of
crime development and noting that it is the "first study providing evidence for underarousal in an antisocial
population in all three psychophysiological response systems"). Further studies showed that measures of
underarousal of the CNS and ANS taken at fifteen years of age were related to criminality status assessed at
twenty-four years of age. Adrian Raine et al., Relationships between Central and Autonomic Measures of
Arousal at Age 15 Years and Criminality at Age 24 Years, 47 Archives Gen. Psych. 1003, 1003 (1990).
Lowered levels of arousal were accompanied by decreased activation of the reticular activating system (RAS),
which is the part of the brain that controls sleep/wake cycles and arousal, and lowered hypothalamic-modulated
stress responses. See id. Generally speaking, the hypothalamus, along with the RAS, helps regulate the body's
physiological response to stress, often referred to as "fight or flight." Robert M. Sapolsky, Stress, the Aging
Brain, and the Mechanisms of Neuron Death 3-9 (MIT Press 1992). For a more detailed discussion of the
stress response, see Edgar Garcia-Rill & Erica Beecher-Monas, Gatekeeping Stress: The Science and
Admissibility of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 24 UALR L. Rev. 9, 12-14 (2001) (noting that in order to
initiate "fight-or-flight" responses, the RAS projects into many regions, simultaneously alerting the cortex to
the event, priming the motor system to be able to fight or flee, and to the hypothalamus, where the arousal
response triggers the stress response).
114. Id.
115. See Niehoff, supra n. 96, at 181 (stating that "[n]o warning bell of anxiety or disgust sounds when...
[antisocial individuals are] about to commit an atrocity").
116. Id. For additional information on the studies cited by Niehoff, see also Bo Bergman & Bo Brismar,
Hormone Levels and Personality Traits in Abusive and Suicidal Male Alcoholics, 18 Alcoholism: Clinical &
Experimental Research 311, 311-15 (1994); Keith McBumett et al., Anxiety, Inhibition, and Conduct Disorder
in Children: It. Relation to Salivary Cortisol, 30 J. Am. Acad. Child & Adolescent Psych. 192 (1991); Matti
Virkkunen et al., CSF Biochemistries, Glucose Metabolism, and Diurnal Activity Rhythms in Alcoholic, Violent
Offenders, Fire Setters, and Healthy Volunteers, 51 Archives Gen. Psych. 20, 20-27 (1994); Matti Virkkunen,
Urinary Free Cortisol Secretion in Habitually Violent Offenders, 72 Acta Psychiatrica Scandanavica 40, 40
(1985).
117. See Frederick S. vom Saal, Models of Early Hormonal Effects on Intrasex Aggression in Mice, in
Hormones and Aggressive Behavior 197, 198 (Bruce B. Svare ed., Plenum Press 1983) (observing that even
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The cerebral cortex also plays a role in mediating stress responses, controlling,
through inhibition, impulses from the older, primordial parts of the brain. 118 Humans
have much greater amounts of cerebral cortex than primates and apes, which allow us to
respond more selectively to our environment. All primates exhibit violent aggression in
response to threat, including human infants as young as eighteen months. 119  Most
children learn to decrease the use of physical aggression over time as they learn more
successful social strategies. 12  Some children learn better than others, and some social
environments are more conducive to learning alternative strategies. 121
Moreover, if the cortex is damaged, or suffers from decreased blood flow, or
metabolism, known as "hypofrontality," the cortex loses some of its inhibitory power,
releasing "primordial" behaviors. 122 Damage, decreased uptake of glucose, and reduced
blood flow or reduced function, have all been observed in the frontal cortex of violent
individuals and murderers. 123  Instinctive behaviors, including exaggerated "fight or
flight" responses to misperceived threats, may result in violent or exaggerated behavior
in an attempt to attack or flee. Hypofrontality is evident in such disorders as
schizophrenia, posttraumatic stress disorder, and depression. 124
Events or conditions placing people with these disorders under undue stress could
easily lead to exaggerated responses, such as striking out due to over-perceived threats.
Is this mens rea or mitigation evidence? Quite possibly, and qualified experts should be
permitted to explain these factors to the jury.
3. Sex Hormones
Testosterone plays a major role in sexuality and aggression. 12 5  Although most
violence is perpetrated by young men against other young men struggling over
dominance for reproductive resources, violent tendencies can develop at any time: In
utero, 126 in early infancy, 12 7 or even after the onset of puberty. 128  Although male
intauterine positioning between sibling males and females affects levels of post-birth aggression); Renee J.
Primus & Carol K. Kellogg, Gonadal Hormones During Puberty Organize Environment-Related Social
Interaction in the Male Rat, 24 Hormones & Behavior 311, 320 (1990) ("The presence of testosterone [in
rats]... appears to be critical for the expression of environment-related changes [in social interaction].").
118. See generally Frank N. Dempster, The Rise and Fall of the Inhibitory Mechanism: Toward a Unified
Theory of Cognitive Development and Aging, 12 Dev. Rev. 45 (1992).
119. See Richard E. Tremblay, Prevention of Chronic Physical Aggression: An Epigenetic Perspective, in
Crime and Schizophrenia, supra n. 97, at 267, 274.
120. Id. at 274-75.
121. Id.at281.
122. See e.g. Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia Rill, Genetic Predictions of Future Dangerousness: Is
There a Blueprint for Violence? 69 L. & Contemp. Probs. 301 (2006).
123. Raine et al., supra n. 112; see also Hugo D. Critchley et al., Prefrontal and Medial Temporal
Correlates of Repetitive Violence to Self and Others, 47 Biological Psych. 928, 931-33 (2000); J. Grafman et
al., Frontal Lobe Injuries, Violence, and Aggression: A Report of the Vietnam Head Injury Study, 46 Am.
Acad. Neurology 1231, 1231 (1996).
124. See e.g. Edgar Garcia-Rill, Disorders of the Reticular Activating System, 49 Med. Hypotheses 379,
381-82 (1997) (reviewing study that showed hypofrontality in schizophrenic patients).
125. See Florence Thibaut, Perspectives on Treatment Interventions in Paraphilias, in Handbook of Medical
Psychiatry 909-18 (J.C. Soares & S. Gershon eds., Marcel Dekker 2003) (reviewing literature).
126. See e.g. Constance Holden, The Violence of the Lambs, 289 Sci. 580 (2000) (noting that "[r]esearchers
are increasingly coming to view violence as the end result of multiple risk factors that may include a biological
vulnerability-either genetic or created in the prenatal environment-that can be brought out or reinforced by
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mammals have higher levels of physical violence than females, and although the
violence follows the testosterone curve, its role remains unclear. 129 A number of studies
link high testosterone levels in adults with violent behavior. 130 In childhood aggression,
however, low testosterone levels appear to be linked to violent aggression.
131
Testosterone levels are at least partly heritable.
Although pedophilia is not well studied, some researchers believe that neurological
deficits, chromosome aberration, or early childhood abuse or sexual experience may
imprint desire onto inappropriate outlets. 132 Some potentially important anomalies have
been observed in pedophiles. Right temporal lobe hypometabolism has been identified
in adult pedophiles 133 as have lower baseline cortisol levels, 134 and monoaminergic
dysfunction. 135  The best available evidence suggests some disruption in the
development of the neurosystem. 136 While exposure to physical violence in childhood
predisposes adults to violence, it is unclear whether exposure to sexual abuse in
childhood has the same effect on sexual offending. 137 Approximately thirty percent of
all adult sex offenders were sexually abused as children.
While both rape and child molestation are categorized as sexual violence under
most sexual offending statutes, rape appears to be more of an aggressive and dominance
strategy-a weapon, rather than an appetite. 138 Testosterone blocking drugs appear to
the social environment").
127. Frans B. M. de Waal, Primates-A Natural Heritage of Conflict Resolution, 289 Sci. 586, 588 (2000)
(discussing the violence between two infant monkeys after displaying aggression and biting each other).
128. E.g. Niehoff, supra n. 96, at 159.
129. See Thibaut, supra n. 124, at 910.
130. See e.g. J.A. Harris, Review and Methodological Considerations in Research on Testosterone and
Aggression, 4 Aggression & Violent Behavior 273, 273-91 (1999) (reviewing studies).
131. See generally Richard E. Tremblay et al., Testosterone, Physical Aggression, Dominance, and Physical
Development in Early Adolescence, 11 Intl. J. Behavioral Dev. 753 (1998).
132. See F. S. Berlin et al., A Five-Year Plus Follow-Up Survey of Criminal Recidivism within a Treated
Cohort of 406 Pedophiles, 12 Am. J. Forensic Psychol. 5 (1991); Fred S. Berlin & Edgar Kraut, Pedophilia
Diagnostic Concepts, Treatment and Ethical Considerations, 7 Am. J. Forensic Psychol. 13 (1986).
133. See generally Mario F. Mendez et al., Pedophilia and Temporal Lobe Disturbances, 12 J.
Neuropsychiatry & Clinical Neuroscience 71, 71-76 (2000) (suggesting that "[a] predisposition to pedophilia
may be unmasked by hypersexuality from brain disease").
134. See generally Michael Maes et al., Lower Baseline Plasma Cortisol and Prolactin Together with
Increased Body Temperature and Higher mCPP-Induced Cortisol Responses in Men with Pedophilia, 24
Neuropsychopharmacology 37, 37-44 (2001) (studying hormonal and serotonergic alterations in pedophiles).
135. See Martin P. Kafka, The Monoamine Hypothesis for the Pathophysiology of Paraphilic Disorders: An
Update, 989 Annals N.Y. Acad. Sci. 86, 91 (2003) (reviewing data on the role of monoamine neuromodulators
in paraphiliacs and concluding that "a specific role for these neuromodulators in the paraphilic condition
remains neither proven nor rejected").
136. F.S. Berlin & E. Krout, Pedophilia: Diagnosis Concepts, Treatment, and Ethical Considerations, 7 Am.
J. Forensic Psych. 13, 20 (1986) (observing that "the best available evidence suggests that most sexual
deviance and paraphilia is caused by very early biomedical events leading to neurodevelopmental disruption").
137. Compare e.g. John Monahan et al., Rethinking Risk Assessment: The MacArthur Study of Mental
Disorder and Violence 54-55 (Oxford U. Press 2001) (noting that "[a]lthough prior physical abuse as a
child... [is] associated with postdischarge violence, prior sexual abuse was not") with Ctr. Sex Offender Mgt.,
Understanding Juvenile Sexual Offending Behavior: Emerging Research, Treatment Approaches and
Management Practices, http://www.csom.org/pubs/juvbrflO.html (Dec. 1999) (reporting that twenty to fifty
percent of sexually abusive youth had a history of physical abuse, while forty to eighty percent had a history of
sexual abuse).
138. See Niehoff, supra n. 96, at 164 (claiming rape is motivated by aggression); Grant T. Harris et al.,
Appraisal and Management of Risk in Sexual Aggressors: Implications for Criminal Justice Policy, 4 Psychol.
Pub. Policy & L. 73, 85 (1998) ("[A]lthough rapists are more dangerous [than child molesters] (i.e., more likely
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chill sexual behavior but not anti-social aggression. 139 There is no evidence that sex
offenders have either increased androgen levels or receptor activity. 140
B. Do Genes Determine Behavior?
None of this evidence suggests that genes determine behavior. Behavior
(including violent aggression and sexual deviance) results from interacting factors
including genes, social circumstances, economic, cultural, and developmental factors. 14 1
But it works the other way around as well: Brains and behavior also switch genes on and
off. 142 Brain diseases also affect behavior, and some diseases may be the result of errant
genes, while others are the result of developmental problems or environmental insults. 143
When there is evidence of such a genetic anomaly, it is information important to
understanding the behavior of an individual. To the extent that the intent behind an
individual's actions is relevant (that is, in a case not involving strict criminal liability), if
such information is available, and the expert can demonstrate its scientific basis, it
should be presented to the fact finder. If the circumstances under which a person acted
are relevant to a jury's moral deliberations in deciding about whether to impose the death
penalty, and if those circumstances include genetic influences, then, as long as the expert
can demonstrate a scientific basis, that information should also be before the jury.
Similarly, if there is a genetic correlate for mental retardation, schizophrenia,144 or other
mental disease, that would be useful information in determining whether the defendant
was malingering.
In terms of prevention, any attempt to prevent violent behavior will implicate
many forms of science, including knowledge about ways in which altering specific
factors can alter the behavioral outcome. Genetic traits cannot be changed (at least not
easily), but the environment, or the underlying mechanisms of response to environmental
stimuli, can be. 14 5 The monoamine oxidase A gene is a case in point. People with the
genetic anomaly (which is a recessive gene located on the X chromosome, so primarily
men-who have only one X chromosome-are affected) have a higher incidence of
to exhibit violent recidivism) overall, much of that violence does not appear to be sexually motivated.").
139. Niehoff, supra n. 96, at 164; but see Raine et al., supra n. 112, at 94 (citing studies showing that
"administration of anti-androgens and progesterone derivatives have some effect in lowering violence and
sexual aggression").
140. See Anu S. Aromaki et al., Testosterone, Sexuality and Antisocial Personality in Rapists and Child
Molesters: A Pilot Study, 110 Psych. Research 239, 239-47 (2002).
141. See Robert Wachtbroit, Understanding the Genetics-of- Violence Controversy, in Genetics & Criminal
Behavior 25, 33 (David Wasserman & Robert Wachbroit eds., Cambridge U. Press 2001) (discussing the
fallacies of reductionism).
142. See Matt Ridley, Genome: The Autobiography of a Species in 23 Chapters 152-56 (Harper Collins
1999) (noting that "it is the body that switches on genes when it needs them, often in response to a more or less
cerebral or even conscious, reaction to external events" and giving as examples the increase in cortisol levels of
a young male baboon joining a new group and establishing its rank in the social pecking order; and
experiments showing an increase in stress hormones with a loss of control in British civil servants).
143. See Dean Mobbs et al., Law, Responsibility, and the Brain, 5 PLoS Biology 693 (Apr. 2007) (available
at http://ssm.com/abstract=982487) (noting that brain diseases reduce the ability to act freely).
144. A recent study demonstrated genetic links to schizophrenia. See e.g. Benedict Carey, Study Ties Genetic
Variations to Schizophrenia, www.nytimes.com/2008/03/28/science/28gene.html (Mar. 28, 2008).
145. See Baker et al., supra n. 45, at 34 (explaining that modifying the environment can change patterns of
response).
2007]
TULSA LA W RE VIEW
violent behavior, but only if they were abused as children. 14 6 Theoretically, one could
alter the potential for behavioral problems in a child afflicted with this anomaly by
adding monamine oxidase A to the child's system, but one could also change it by
preventing parental abuse. An example of this kind of interaction is the huge success of
neonatal screening for phenylketonalanine (PKU), a genetic anomaly that results in
mental retardation. PKU testing of newborn children is now routine hospital procedure.
Simply modifying the infant's diet (by omitting foods containing phenylalanine) "cures"
the condition, preventing the gene's expression.
This is not only true for the nervous system. All traits, from biological traits like
hair and height to complex psychological traits like intelligence, are caused by
interdependent interactions of genes, development, and the environment. Genetic factors
may instigate the process, but at every point in the building and tuning process of
creating and maintaining an individual, the environment plays a hand.
C. Let the Jury Decide the Weight
Once the judge has decided on the relevance and reliability of the scientific
testimony, it ought to go to the jury. Yet, the question of whether evidence of genetic
influences helps or hurts defendants is one with which the courts continue to struggle. In
Schriro v. Landrigan,1 4 7 Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, opined that "assuring
the court that genetics made [Landrigan] the way he is could not have been very
helpful," and "the mitigating evidence he seeks to introduce would not have changed the
result."' 14 8 Although a number of pre-Landrigan cases had upheld ineffective assistance
claims for failing to present genetic evidence, 14 9 the more prevalent result has been the
refusal to find ineffective assistance on that basis, generally because the court felt that
the unpresented testimony would not have made a difference in the outcome. 1
50
146. See Avshalom Caspi et al., supra n. 102, at 851-53 (studying 442 men in New Zealand for differences
in MAOA activity alleles and correlating these differences with maltreatment in childhood and subsequent
violent behavior). The results demonstrated that the high activity form of the gene did not manifest in violent
propensities even if the men had been mistreated as boys, while those with the low-active form of the gene,
who had been mistreated, committed four times as many rapes, assaults, and robberies as the average. Id. A
second study by the Caspi group in 2003 also reported on a gene-environment interaction, this time in the
promoter region of the serotonin transporter gene. Caspi, supra n. 108, at 386-89 (reporting on the interaction
between the short allele of the serotonin transporter gene and stressful environment).
147. 127 S. Ct. 1933.
148. Id. at 1944. This echoes the reservations of the dissent in the Ninth Circuit, which thought that "the
mitigating value of any proven genetic predisposition for violence would not have outweighed its aggravating
tendency to suggest Landrigan was undeterrable and, even from prison, would present a future danger to
society." Landrigan, 441 F.3d at 651 (Bea, J., dissenting).
149. See e.g. Hendricks v. Calderon, 864 F. Supp. 929, 947 (N.D. Cal. 1994), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1111
(granting habeas relief); Fudge v. State, 120 S.W.3d 600, 602-03 (Ark. 2003) (remanding based on ineffective
assistance claims because counsel had failed to present evidence of defendant's genetic or learned propensity
for violence).
150. Johnson v. Quartermain, 483 F.3d 278, 288 (5th Cir. 2007) (denying certificate of appealability for
ineffective assistance despite affidavit from mitigation specialist regarding unpresented evidence of genetic
predisposition to substance abuse, mental illness, and childhood abuse because "even if considered, the
affidavit would provide no grounds for relief because in the context of [defendant's] extensive history of
extreme and brutal violence" it would make little difference); Cauthern, 145 S.W.3d at 578, 628-29 (failure to
present evidence of genetic predisposition to impulsive behavior did not amount to ineffective assistance
because such testimony would have made no difference in the outcome); U.S. v. Curtis, 44 Mil. J. 106 (Armed
Forces App. 1996) (no ineffective assistance for failure to present evidence of genetic predisposition to
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This is a spurious quandary, because whether the testimony of a genetic
predisposition to violence would help or hurt the defendant's case is a quintessential jury
question. A primary function of the jury is to bring the voice of the community to bear
on conflicting and contradictory evidence, and to draw inferences from the evidence to
determine the probable course of events. The jury is composed of individuals with a
variety of backgrounds and experiences, is independent of the government, and is a one-
time actor in the justice system.
One of the key features of justice-at least in the United States-is the jury. 151
The jury system provides a structure for citizen participation and brings the voice of the
community into the process of legal decision-making. 152 It is integral to the separation
of powers doctrine. 153 In giving citizens the right and obligation to participate in the
judicial system, the Framers believed that they were implementing democracy by
interposing "the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen" between the accuser and
the accused. 154  The jury was expected to bring community values to what might
otherwise become arbitrary decision-making.1
5 5
The jury's role as fact finder is thus supplemented and informed by its role as the
moral voice of the community. It is precisely in making difficult factual and moral
decisions that the jury is most valuable. Pre-empting the presentation of expert
testimony regarding genetic influences or other biological information that may bear on
either the guilt or sentencing phase of the proceedings ought to be based on something
more than judicial instinct. In order to keep relevant and reliable information from the
jury, courts should at least have a principled basis, rather than the current ad-hoc
approach.
V. CONCLUSION
Whether the evidence of genetic predisposition to violence (or sexual violence) has
a sound scientific basis depends of course, on the proffered testimony. The courts appear
to have been correct about the unreliability of XYY testimony for proving a
predisposition to violence. The MAOA link, however, appears to rest on a more solid
foundation. In Mobley, where the defense sought genetic testing for MAOA deficiency,
the scientific basis at the time was a single study of a Dutch family linking the genetic
anomaly to behavioral problems. 156  The court thought that the theory of a MAOA
alcoholism).
151. Rita J. Simon, The Jury: Its Role in American Society 6-7 (Lexington Bks. 1980) (describing the role of
popular participation in the administration of justice).
152. See Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 Minn. L. Rev. 639,
653-56, 654 n. 47 (1973) (discussing the British circumvention of the colonists' right to trial by jury as a
significant cause of the American Revolution).
153. See id. at 662-71 (discussing the jury as a popular check on the three branches of government).
154. See Williams v. Fla., 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1978) (noting the "community participation and shared
responsibility that results from the [jury's] determination of guilt or innocence"). For an argument that the
decline of jury trials represents a significant erosion of democracy, see Jason Mazzone, The Justice and the
Jury, 72 Brook. L. Rev. 35, 55-56 (2006) (discussing the jury jurisprudence of Justice Blackmun and noting
that in federal court, juries resolve only about four percent of criminal cases).
155. See Bernard Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History vol. 1, 3-16 (Chelsea H. 1971)
(discussing the function of the jury as a bulwark against tyranny).
156. Mobley, 455 S.E.2d at 65. The Brunner study was the basis for the defense request. See Hans G.
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deficiency link to crime was premature, 157 and at the time, it may have been. But there
are more sophisticated studies available now, and the courts will not be as justified in
dismissing the science as premature.
There are several conclusions to be drawn from the use of genetic testimony in
criminal trials. First, the scientific basis for such testimony is often extremely shaky.
Such unfounded testimony ought to be excluded. Second, there is some evidence about
genetic links to crime that is more firmly founded, such as MAOA, and if the defense
can establish the scientific basis for the expert testimony, the defense should be able to
present this evidence to the jury as a mitigating factor, along with all the typical
background factors (like childhood abuse) that go to mitigation. Failure to explore this
option should be considered ineffective assistance. Third, whether the jury actually finds
genetic testimony mitigating or aggravating should be left to the jury. Excluding
testimony about genetic predisposition based on the judge's assessment that it would be
aggravating prevents the defendant from providing a full defense, and removes
community assessment from an important problem.
Brunner et al., Abnormal Behavior Associated with a Point Mutation in the Structural Gene for Monoamine
OxidaseA, 262 Sci. 578 (1993).
157. Mobley, 455 S.E.2d at 66.
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